Evolution towards competence
The New York Times has just published an article about the Nov 13th Paris attacks based on French Intelligence documents. This provides some of the most detailed information on ISIS’ European tradecraft so far.
The Bombs
ISIS has standardised their IED construction into an industrial level process. Inside their controlled territory, ISIS has factories operated by trained technicians who produce standardised bombs based on refined templates. The ISIS bomb construction training program is successful in training people to make their own explosives, detonators, and assemble them into functional IEDs. This is an important part of operational terrorism. The ability to construct working bombs and to pass that skillset on to other people.
[TATP] has become the signature explosive for Islamic State operations in Europe
In Europe, ISIS does not appear to have access to industrial or military explosives. Instead they have to improvise TATP, just like pretty much every other terrorist group. The ingredients are fairly easy to acquire and pretty much any idiot can cook it up. There are even plenty of YouTube guides.
The important point here is simply that ISIS has a trained skilled bomb maker who can produce consistently functional bombs. This guy might have died in the Paris attacks, or he might still be in Europe (he’s probably dead). Security forces found traces of the final assembly point for the suicide vests, but have not announced the discovery of the bomb factory.
If the bomb maker is alive (unlikely) and if he has an undiscovered bomb factory (unlikely), then the good news is that apparently his skills are probably limited to creating TATP suicide vests and not more powerful bombs.
Experts agree: Weak ass, unstable TATP for suicide vests? What the fuck were they thinking?
@joedymott @ashponders @thegrugq 3) TATP choice for main charge in vests of active shooters raises Qs of whether they face logistical limits
— C.J. Chivers (@cjchivers) March 20, 2016
@joedymott @ashponders @thegrugq 4) bc given sensitivity of TATP most bombmakers wouldn't pack vest w that if wearer was to move much.
— C.J. Chivers (@cjchivers) March 20, 2016
The Planning
Earlier ISIS terrorist attacks in Europe have been small affairs. A sole operative conducting (or planning to conduct) a single attack. The Paris attack was new in a number of ways. Multiple operatives executed a series of coordinated attacks that targeted both a symbolic target (the national stadium) and aimed for mass casualties (the restaurants and the concert.)
This attack required a reasonably complex level of coordination and planning, including logistics for two final staging safe houses, multiple vehicles and timed launches of the different assault phases. The coordination was handled in Brussels via mobile phone.
It is a bit interesting how so much of the logistical work for this operation was conducted in the clear. Salah used his name and his credit card extensively. If he was under surveillance, his activities would have been a major red flag. The lax operational environment in Belgium had more to do with the secrecy of the preparations than the cell’s security protocols.
Tactical Sophistication
The attack on the concert hall involved three gunmen. Two entered from the front, driving concert goers towards the emergency exits. The third waited to ambush them as they emerged from building.
One of the cellphones used by the attackers contained archived images of the Bataclan’s layout, suggesting they had planned their trap carefully, the police report said.
The ambush had been planned in advance using research data collected from the Internet. There are faint echoes of Mumbai, but realistically, security forces just have to accept that internet savvy operatives will have access to good tactical information without conducting risky on-the-ground reconnaissance. This is problematic for certain counterterrorism methodologies that rely on detecting terrorist surveillance.
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